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ABSTRACT
The authors of this paper set out to answer the question of whether Keynes’s logical 
theory of probability had an impact on his own economic thinking. The authors 
review criticisms that had been expressed previously; then, with regard to the 
applicability of the classical concept of probability to economics, they introduce 
the foundations of Keynes’s logical theory of probability and the difficulties in-
volved in its practical application. This is followed by an examination – within the 
Keynesian conceptual framework – of the role of uncertainty. The next sections 
are given over to an analysis of the role of “animal spirits”, and of expectations, 
with a discussion of investment decisions made from positions of uncertainty. 
This train of thought focuses on the dilemma of whether there was continuity or 
a break, over time, in the role of probability in economics within the Keynesian 
conceptual framework. After this, the authors outline the competing 20th century 
interpretations of probability embodied by the rearticulated version of relative 
frequency theory on the one hand, and the evolution of probability theory outside 
the economics paradigm on the other. The authors conclude with their asserta-
tion that probability theory did have a considerable impact on Keynes’s thinking 
on economic theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite four centuries of scientific research and the widespread acceptance of for-
malised axiomatic systems, there is no consensus regarding the economic con-
notations of probability.  Instead, various different interpretations have emerged 
through the ages, but none of these settle the debate regarding what probability 
actually is writes Hacking (1975), expressing his doubts. Under the classical ap-
proach, probability is regarded as the ratio of favourable instances to all instances. 
The principle of indifference applies; in other words, if we have no reason to prefer 
one possibility over another, then they have the same probability (Laplace, 1812). 
The frequency approach treats probability as the frequency of successful outcomes 
in a long chain of trials, and thus the probability of a singular event cannot be 
determined (Richard von Mises, 1928). The logical approach sees probability as 
the logical relationship between the premises of a hypothesis and the supporting 
evidence (Keynes, 1921; Carnap, 1959). The subjective interpretation relates to the 
prevailing degree of belief. This value can be determined through a study of our 
actions (willingness to bet). Subjectivist probabilities vary between individuals 
(Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937). The propensity interpretation expresses how the 
probability of an individual event is a property of the conditions generating the 
event. In this case, an individual event can also have a probability if it only occurs 
once (Popper, 1997).
The antinomy of a series of events versus a single instance has always been a crit-
ical aspect of the role of probability in economics. According to Arrow (1951), 
“While it may seem hard to give a justification for using probability statements 
when the event occurs only once, except on the interpretation of probability as de-
gree-of-belief, the contrary position also seems difficult to defend. (…) an extension 
of this reasoning suggests that in almost any reasonable view of probability theory 
the probability of a single event must still be the basis of action where there are 
genuine probabilities” (Arrow, 1951:415).
The interpretations of probability can also be divided epistemologically and on-
tologically, into inductive and objective versions. The inductive (epistemic) ap-
proaches to probability are linked to a person’s knowledge (or belief). In this 
approach, a probability value describes the degree of knowledge, the degree of 
rational belief or simply the degree of belief. The theoretical approaches of both 
John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises fall into this category. In contrast, 
the objective interpretations of probability treat probability as a property of the 
objective, material world, which has no relationship whatsoever to human knowl-
edge or belief. Richard von Mises’s objective probability approach – the frequency 
interpretation – falls into this category; his fundamental objective was to make 
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probability theory analogous to other (exact) sciences (Backhouse–Bateman, 
2006).
Keynes declared the following his A Treatise on Probability (TP) published in 1921, 
which laid the foundations for his subsequent views:
“There appear to be four alternatives:1) Either in some cases there is no prob-
ability at all; or 2) probabilities do not all belong to a single set of magnitudes 
measurable in terms of a common unit; or 3) these measures always exist, but 
in many cases are, and must remain, unknown; or 4) probabilities do belong to 
such a set and their measures are capable of being determined by us, although 
we are not always able so to determine them in practice” (Keynes, TP:33).
Keynes’s 1936 The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (GT) can be 
analysed together with his essay The General Theory of Employment (GTE) pub-
lished in 1937 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. In the GT, Keynes broke away 
from the partial equilibrium analysis-based approach of classical economics, and 
in the main his theory can be regarded as an aggregated general equilibrium 
framework centred on uncertainty. Keynes wrote the GTE with the purpose of 
summarising what the GT had to say and putting forward an even more convinc-
ing argument for its claims. In these latter two papers, Keynes expresses his view 
that the performance of the economy as a whole is mainly determined by the vol-
ume of investment. Keynes considered the quantity of investment to be the factor 
defining “the level of output and employment as a whole” (Keynes, 1937:221).
Given that the basis for Keynes’s conceptual framework is the assumption of un-
certainty, Coddington (1982) is justified in asking whether or not certainty is at-
tainable. Keynes interprets certainty (rational belief) as something that requires 
not only complete confidence in the belief, but also the accuracy of the belief. 
In Keynes’s case, this certainty equates to knowledge. Keynes, therefore, is not 
as sceptical and agnostic as he is assumed to be. Keynes distinguishes between 
two types of knowledge:the kind of knowledge that can be directly obtained, and 
that which can only be obtained indirectly – one is the directly knowable part of 
rational belief, and the other is what we can deduce through argument. (Keynes, 
1921:12).
Keynes committed himself to the broader logic of conclusiveness rather than sim-
ple logical deduction and numerical probabilities. While the relative and absolute 
nature of probabilities both suggest that they do not necessarily exist as a part 
of material reality, an empirical propensity to understand reality is nevertheless 
possible. Lawson (1988) describes Keynes’s attitude towards this as follows:
“…throughout his total contributions he is explicit that ... a priori thought is 
considered always to be open to constant modification and correction through 
continual interaction with experiences of the real world” (Lawson, 1988:56).
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Keynes never left any doubt that probability statements, not being regarded as 
relative frequency, should be contingent on the current evidence and knowledge, 
and that changes in them should also be regarded as natural. Moreover, the at-
tention paid by Keynes to the fundamentally qualitative nature of reality suggests 
that informal argument and intuitive judgement are both necessary for economic 
reasoning, as a formalised model and statistical conclusiveness, and this shows a 
commitment to deductive logic.
These thoughts are expressed concisely by O’Donnell (1999:93) in his description 
of Keynes’s probability theory:“there is a consensus with regard to empiricism 
that experience is a prerequisite for knowledge; Kenyes’s theory of knowledge 
goes further than this, maintaining that much knowledge is impossible without 
a priori reasoning or intuition”. Keynes’s theory of probability had to emphasise 
intuition, and his view in this regard did not weaken, but in fact strengthened, 
which suggests that Keynes was a rationalist. The same can be said of his predic-
tions regarding future value, because Keynes also exercised rational judgement in 
recognising that rational statements about the future are so uncertain that they 
cannot serve as the basis for rational action.
2 CRITICISM OF THE CLASSICAL PROBABILITY CONCEPT
The biggest problem when examining the role of probability is that there is no 
explicit and comprehensive definition of probability that could be applied univer-
sally to all branches of science. This study does not deal with the axioms, postula-
tions and paradigms of mathematical probability calculus. This paper deals with 
the aspects of probability that are related to economics questions in general, and 
specifically to investment decisions. Accordingly, based on the approach proba-
bility may be objective, subjective and logical by nature, and based on the method 
it may be classical probability, relative frequency and propensity interpretation. 
Probability can be interpreted in respect of objective reality, based on the rela-
tionship between the individual and reality, and with regard to the degree of the 
individual’s knowledge.
The oldest of the special probability interpretations is the classical approach. In 
essence, the classical approach means that the probability of an event, in a given 
random trial, is the ratio between the equal-chance outcomes related to a given 
event and the number of equal-probability outcomes. The substance of classical 
probability was most fully described by Laplace (1812). He derived probability 
from general determinism when he wrote:
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and 
the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all 
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forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature 
is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to 
analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the great-
est bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect 
nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present 
before its eyes” (Laplace, 1812:4).
Examining the source of the classical interpretation of probability, Szabó (2011) 
concludes that neither the past nor the future holds any uncertainty for Laplace’s 
all-knowing demon; for us mortals, however, this ultimate knowledge is unat-
tainable.3 On this basis, probability originates from the limitations of human 
knowledge. To substantiate this premise – over time – three essentially identi-
cal principles have been articulated by the great thinkers on the problematics of 
probability. According to the “law of sufficient reason” the symmetry of outcomes 
presupposes identical probability for each outcome. Based on the “law of insuf-
ficient reason”, if we do not know which outcome is more likely, then we assign 
the same probability to each one (Laplace, 1812; Bernoulli, 1713). The “principle of 
indifference” states that equal probabilities must be assigned to each of several 
arguments if there is an absence of positive ground for assigning unequal ones” 
(Keynes, 1921:45).
Keynes’s definition is as follows:
“The Principle of Indifference asserts that if there is no known reason for pred-
icating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then 
relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have 
an equal probability” (Keynes, 1921:42).
Butos–Koppl (1995) points out that this also means the principle only works if 
there is a sound basis for assigning a special set of non-identical weights. In the 
absence of a basis for the assignment of a special set of non-identical weights, the 
principle of indifference demands the assignment of identical weights. Keynes ar-
3 Laplace writes the following on the causes of unattainability of knowledge: “All events, even 
those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are 
a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun. In ignorance of the ties which unite 
such events to the entire system of the universe, they have been made to depend upon final causes 
or upon hazard, according as they occur and are repeated with regularity, or appear without 
regard to order; but these imaginary causes have gradually receded with the  widening bounds of 
knowledge and disappear entirely before sound philosophy, which sees in them only the  expres-
sion of our ignorance of the true causes” (Laplace, 1812:3).
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gued that “it is a necessary condition for the application of the principle, that [we 
take as our basis] indivisible alternatives of the form” (Keynes, 1921:65)4.
Laplace is in no doubt that probability relates partly to our knowledge and partly 
to our lack thereof. According to him, the principle of insufficient reason states 
that if we have no cause to believe more in the occurrence of one out of two or 
more events than in the occurrence of another, then the events must be consid-
ered to have equal probability.
Szabó (2011) highlights that, since Laplace derives his concept of cognitive proba-
bility from general determinism, “we may regard the present state of the universe 
as the effect of its past and the cause of its future” (cited above); in other words, the 
world is governed by determinism. We mortal souls, “however, do not understand 
the threads that tie such events to the whole system of the Universe (and thus) 
make them dependent on aims and randomness” – in other words, probability 
is merely epistemic in nature. If indeterminism reigns in the world; that is, if the 
following states of the world do not unambiguously record each other, then objec-
tive probability could be some kind of degree of that indefiniteness; that is, the 
metaphysical quantity that in some way defines the “distribution” of physically 
possible future states.
The classical concept of probability emerged as a formalised theory in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century as the theory of relative frequency. Its main propo-
nent was John Venn (1888–1962), who regarded the sequence and the limit as the 
cornerstones of his theory. Observations of games of chance showed that with 
an increase the number of experiments (in a sufficiently long series of results) 
the relative frequency fluctuates around a defined value, “holding” to a certain 
value. This is the limit of the sequence, which is regarded as the probability of the 
event. Venn created the framework on which the frequency interpretation could 
be based. He defined the concept of the “sequence”, which has central importance 
in frequency theory, and is a chain of events, each having certain important prop-
erties. Probability is related to an infinite sequence of recurring events.
The sequence of events is a prerequisite for probability expressed as relative fre-
quency. The attempt to determine the probability of occurrence of a given event 
(to assign a mathematical probability value to its occurrence) presupposes the ex-
istence of a sequence of which the given event is a part. Proponents of the concept 
of relative frequency identified probability with statistical frequency.
4 “In short, the Principle of Indifference is not applicable to a pair of alternatives, if we know that 
either of them is capable of being further split up into a pair of possible but incompatible alterna-
tives of the same form as the original pair” (Keynes, 1921:67).
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Amsterdamski (1965) takes a mostly sympathetic approach to Venn’s theory of 
relative frequency. He believes that the frequency theory captures the fact that, in 
everyday probability statements one talks about how much “chance” there is of a 
certain type of event occurring, and not about the extent to which any possible 
data logically support the appropriate hypothesis. In his opinion, Venn believes 
that probability only relates to mass events that can be statistically captured. Am-
sterdamski supports the relevance of the frequency theory with numerous eve-
ryday examples. In his view, certain statistical distributions are very stable:These 
include the ability of people to live to a certain age, the distribution of newborn 
babies by sex, the results of throwing dice or spinning a roulette wheel, the inci-
dence of persons with specified distinguishing features within certain biologi-
cal populations, the distributions relating to the decay of radioactive atoms. The 
actions of insurance companies, gamblers or physicists making statements on 
the future state of a microsystem are based on the conviction that the concept of 
probability relates to physical reality, and not to the logical relationships between 
judgements (Amsterdamski, 1965:268).
There were widespread doubts about the applicability of relative frequency theory 
to fields of economics, and the theory was subjected to harsh criticism. The defini-
tion of probability as a limiting value of relative frequencies in an infinite series 
assumes that the number of experiments continues beyond every limit towards 
infinity. Conducting an infinite number of experiences, however, is impossible for 
two reasons. Firstly, the human lifespan is finite; and secondly, the circumstances 
of the events constituting the series can also change over a long period of time. 
Another objection is related to the concept of probability itself. The “favourable 
outcome/all outcomes” ratios do not make up a convergent series even if the rela-
tive frequencies fluctuate around a determined value. In other words, the best that 
can be said is that relative frequency is a good approximation of the probability 
value.
Arrow (1951) takes a highly critical vie of the identification of relative frequency 
with probability. Firstly, he criticises the reduction of probability to a simple ratio, 
as follows:
“In the whole calculus of probabilities, there is a process of evaluating the 
probabilities of complex events on the basis of a knowledge of the probabilities 
of simpler ones. This process cannot go on indefinitely; there must be a begin-
ning somewhere. Hence, in the study of games of chance, an a priori judgment 
is usually made as to certain probabilities. But in the usual types of events 
which occur in insurance or business affairs, there is no natural way of mak-
ing these judgments; instead, the appeal is to past observations, if anything” 
(Arrow, 1951:411).
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Arrow questions the equivalence of relative frequency and probability in rela-
tion to the law of large numbers. In its simplest form, this law articulated by J. 
Bernoulli states that in a series of independent trials where the given event E may 
occur with a constant probability p in each experiment, by selecting a sufficiently 
large number of trials it is possible to make the probability of the relative frequen-
cy of occurrence of E in n trials differ from p by more than an assigned positive 
value. Naturally, it remains true that given an infinite number of trials, however 
large the number of trials, “we cannot identify relative frequency with probability 
itself ” (Arrow, 1951:414.).
Arrow (1951) reiterates Laplace’s (1812) well-known assertion quoted above, albeit 
in a different thought structure. Arrow justifiably asks “whether or not there is 
any ‘objective’ uncertainty in the economic universe, in the sense that a supreme-
ly intelligent mind knowing completely all the available data could know the fu-
ture with certainty” (op. cit. 405). His answer to this question is that “the tangled 
web of the problem of human free will does not really have to be unravelled for 
our purpose; surely, in any case, our ignorance of the world is so much greater 
than the ‘true’ limits to possible knowledge” (op. cit. 406).
On this basis, we are left in no doubt that Arrow does not identify relative frequency 
with probability and that he sees the latter fundamentally as an epistemic rather 
than an ontological problem, believing that probabilities are only rarely known 
with certainty. In a strict interpretation, only idealised schematic instances of 
known probability are unambiguous, such as a dice roll or a coin toss, the rules 
of which are beyond doubt. In real-life situations – even if we act on the basis of 
a firm probability estimate – we cannot be certain that this estimate is wholly ac-
curate, because there is also uncertainty.
The critics of classical probability theory believed that frequency probability does 
not encompass everything that we think of as probability. In his comparative 
study of schools of thought on probability, Hauwe (2011) concludes that “clearly 
the random frequency definition of probability is too narrow to encompass what we 
mean when we use the term probability. We do say of unique events that they are 
more or less probable. Many decisions that people make daily are based on prob-
ability statements that have no frequency interpretation” (Hauwe, 2011:500).
Knight (1921) questions the wide-ranging applicability of frequency probability 
based on the uniqueness of economic decisions when he writes:
“The ... mathematical, or a priori type of probability is practically never met 
with in business. … Business decisions ... deal with situations which are far 
too unique, generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have 
any value for guides. The conception of an objectively measurable probability 
of chance is simply inapplicable” (1921:219).
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However, Knight also commented that, besides the inapplicability of probability 
to decision-making, another important circumstance is that “at the bottom of the 
uncertainty problem in economic is the forward-looking character of the eco-
nomic process itself” (op. cit. 237).
By the end of the 19th century it head become clear that the classical interpreta-
tion of probability does not guarantee the quantification of probability, and nor 
is it suitable for the probability rating of individual events and decisions in the 
absence of a series of events. These limitations stimulated intellectual exploration 
and the development of new probability interpretations.5
3 THE KEYNESIAN LOGICAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY
In his 1921 work based on logic and philosophy, A Treatise on Probability,6 Keynes 
elaborated a conception of probability that placed the roles of uncertainty, ex-
pectations and behaviour in decision-making on a radically new footing. Keynes 
defined one of the work’s declared aims as being that it “theorises the methods of 
reasoning that we actually use, as opposed to the ultra-rationality of perfect logi-
cal insight that is held to be omniscient” (Keynes, 1921:135).
Another paper by Keynes (1937) contains an explanation for his departure from 
the fundamental ideas of classical economics:
“I sum up, therefore, the main grounds of my departure [from the traditional 
theory] as follows:The orthodox theory assumes that we have a knowledge of 
the future of a kind quite different from that which we actually possess. This 
false rationalism follows the lines of the Benthamite calculus. The hypothesis 
of a calculable future leads to a wrong interpretation of the principles of be-
haviour which the need for action compels us to adopt, and to an underesti-
5 Weintraub (1975) concisely expressed the situation prevailing at the turn of the 19th and 20th 
centuries as follows: “At that time the only explicit theory which delineated the meaning of the 
proposition “the probability that x is y is p” was that of Venn, which provided a relative frequency 
interpretation of probability statements. Such a theory asserted that the meaning of “the prob-
ability that x is y is p” was that a large number of cases had been examined in which x was y and 
x was not y, and p was the proportion of the former in the total number of cases” (1975:532).
6 “Between 1906 and 1911 Keynes was devoting all his spare time to the theory of Probability. ... In 
1912 other work supervened, and his treatise had to be left on one side until 1920, when he pol-
ished it up before its appearance in 1921. Thus, it was his main work from the age of twenty-three 
to twenty-nine.” This work attempted to carry out, for the theory of probability, the program 
initiated by Russell and Whitehead for mathematics, namely, to provide a logical foundation for 
the subject” (Weintraub, 1975: 535).
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mation of the concealed factors of utter doubt, precariousness, hope and fear” 
(Keynes, 1937:221).
Here, Keynes is claiming that the classical (traditional) theory encompasses situa-
tions that are handled with the tools of probability in keeping with the application 
of risk. The classical theory assumes that a person can maximise the expected 
payouts despite that fact that the likely values cannot be reliably calculated. More-
over, the individual must act today, whereas the impacts of his or her choices will 
only become known in the future; however, every economic action taking place 
at a certain time has intertemporal consequences. An economic entity has to base 
its decisions on something; this thing may be a processing of the recent past or 
something else, although such a framework for decision-making “being based on 
so flimsy a foundation ... is subject to sudden and violent changes” (op. cit. 214).
Keynes did not believe that entrepreneurs make a list of all the possible future 
outcomes, assign a probability to every item on the list, and then calculate the 
expected value. Entrepreneurs cannot perform a Benthamite calculation (Ben-
tham,1789) of long-term values. Keynes stated that “our existing knowledge does 
not provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation” (Keynes, 
1936:152).
The foundation of Keynes’s structure is differentiation between any two items of 
the probability assignment, the premise. In his view, every argument h originates 
from the conclusion derived from a set of premises and is based on the logical 
probability relation between a and h. Typically, the premises only offer partial as-
sistance in reaching the conclusion. Assuming that the premises are true, it would 
not be rational to believe in the conclusion with complete confidence; it would be 
more rational to believe it with a certain degree of confidence. O’Donnell (1990a) 
highlights that Keynes’s probabilities thereby express several aspects of the argu-
ment – they show the degree of partial entailment (that is, the extent to which a 
follows from h; they express the degree of rational belief, how much a can be be-
lieved in a knowledge of h); and they also express the degree of certainty:Keynes 
denoted this with the symbol a/h.7
Keynes regarded his probability theory, like economics, to be a part of logic; and 
at the beginning of his treatise he made it clear that his theory – in essence – 
7 Keynes’s theory of probability in A Treatise on Probability (TP, 1921) is based on Boole’s mathe-
matical logic as set out in Boole’s work The Laws of Thought (LT, 1854). Based on this, reality is rela-
tional by nature. Probability is linked to the arguments, not to the outcomes, events or individual 
statements. The arguments comprise two types of statements. These two types of statements are 
referred to as premises and conclusions. At the same time, statements can relate to outcomes and/
or events. Keynes denotes the premise with an h and the conclusion with an a. The equation a/h = 
α is Keynes’s original symbol of the probability relation between a and h (Brady, 2018).
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was objective. For him, probability of the degree of rational belief, not simply the 
degree of belief. It is worth quoting the relevant passage – as a summation of 
Keynes’s probability doctrine – in its entirety:
“The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational be-
lief about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorise us 
to entertain. All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of 
them depends on our circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak 
of propositions as certain or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in 
which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or hypothetical, and not 
a characteristic of the propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable 
at the same time of varying degrees of this relationship, depending upon the 
knowledge to which it is related, so that it is without significance to call a 
proposition probable unless we specify the knowledge to which we are relating 
it. To this extent, therefore, probability may be called subjective. But in the 
sense important to logic, probability is not subjective. It is not, that is to say, 
subject to human caprice. A proposition is not probable because we think it 
so. When once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, what is 
probable or improbable in these circumstances has been fixed objectively, and 
is independent of our opinion. The Theory of Probability is logical, therefore, 
because it is concerned with the degree of belief which it is rational to enter-
tain in given conditions, and not merely with the actual beliefs of particular 
individuals, which may or may not be rational” (Keynes, 1921:3–4).
Keynes (1921), in his Treatise on Probability, rejected the theory of relative fre-
quency. Instead, In its place, Keynes proposes that probability is not related to the 
balance of favourable and unfavourable evidence, but to the balance of the abso-
lute quantity of relevant knowledge and that of relevant ignorance, in such a way 
that the discovery of new evidence increases the weight of the argument. In Wein-
traub’s (1975) view, at that time Keynes’s argument consisted of the following:“In 
order for probability to use probability to guide choice in matters of fundamental 
uncertainty one needed to discuss not only the probability but also the confidence 
one held in that probability. ... Consequently, an economic agent ought not max-
imise expects payoffs, when weach of an array of payoffs is assigned a probability 
number by the agent, if he has little confidence in those probabilities”.
O’Donnell made an important discovery in recognising that the TP was more 
logical than epistemic in character.  Keynes’s fundamental aim was to solve the 
conundrum relating to the rational, but not conclusive argument; to analyse and 
confirm those non-quantifiable arguments, in science, everyday life and else-
where, that can be believed to be rational in a certain sense, but which does not 
have deductive evidentiary force. Keynes’s solution was to place this family of ar-
guments under the rule of logic by making probability theory synonymous with 
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logic theory. Thus, probability became a general theory of logic applied to the logi-
cal relationship between any pair of arguments, with the inclusion of traditional 
deductive logic as a special case. The natural driver of this project was the logical 
concept of probability, in which probability related to the logical relationship be-
tween statements; a typical example of this was the argument in which the prem-
ises only partially support the conclusion. Keynes referred to these relationships 
of partial support or attraction – between premises – as probability relationships, 
and he came to the additional conclusion that these relationships express the de-
gree of rational belief, which guaranteed for individuals the ability to draw con-
clusions from such arguments.8
Keynes’s TP is concerned with the path, leading from the premises to the con-
clusion, that is conceivable but not certain. Starting out from the premises, we 
attempt to confirm a certain degree of the rational belief for every variant of the 
conclusions. We can do this by assuming a certain logical relationship between 
the premises and the conclusions. The version of rational belief that we arrive at 
in this way can be designated as probable (or bordering on the certain), and the 
logical relationships that we gain with this perception can be marked as probabil-
ity relationships. (cf. Hauwe, 2011). Downward (1998) argues that “ from a purely 
logical point of view new evidence implies a new, unique, probability relation. 
Probability is not something that can be learned about but is a logical relationship, 
between sets of propositions, expressed as a conditional statement in the light of 
background knowledge or evidence. Representing probabilities with reference to a 
relative frequency distribution thus cannot make sense.”
One of the most disputed aspects of Keynes’s logical theory of probability is its 
objective or subjective nature. Rosser (2001) asserts that an important aspect of 
Keynes’s view on probability is that he himself considered them to be essentially 
subjective; that is, something that can be constructed on the basis of internal logic 
rather than from mathematical calculations of the distribution of external obser-
vations. Our earlier Keynes quotes, and their interpretation by critics and sup-
8 Hársing (1971) emphasises that, in Keynes’s approach, probability is a peculiar logical relation-
ship: the relationship between premises and the conclusion. It is customary in literature on sci-
entific theory and logical probability to refer to the premises as evidence. This designation is 
fitting in two ways: (1) The premises make up the knowledge that we accept as true within a given 
train of thought; that is, we consider them to be evident. (2) The primary meaning of the word 
“evidence” is similar to that of “proof”. The methodological function of the premises is also to 
lend probability to knowledge (conclusions), the truth of which we cannot recognise directly, but 
only indirectly through statements in a logical relationship determined by them. In terms of their 
origin, such statements are hypotheses. This latter interpretation of “evidence” must certainly 
have contributed to the definition of probability as the degree to which hypotheses are proven.
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porters alike, prove neither unilateral objectivity nor unconditional subjectivity 
in relation to Keynes’s theory.
Hársing (1965) provides a convincing explanation to resolve this dilemma. His 
analysis starts out from the fact that we can differentiate between objective phe-
nomena that exist independently of human consciousness, which are customar-
ily referred to as events in probability theory, and the subjective mirror-images 
of these that are created in our consciousness. In this way, we can describe the 
extent of the basis for an objective phenomenon as objective probability, and 
the extent of some inferred knowledge (hypothesis) that has been determined 
indirectly (based on observations, experiments etc.) as logical probability. Essen-
tially, the latter form of probability is also objective in nature, because the prob-
ability of a given hypothesis being correct is based on knowledge (judgements) 
where the phenomena encapsulated by the judgements are objectively related to 
the phenomenon in the hypothesis. Just as logical probability directly describes 
the relationships between judgements, and since the judgements – like all human 
knowledge – are subjective images of the phenomena of objective reality, logical 
probability also has a subjective side. Hársing’s recognition of the subjective as-
pect of logical probability has great importance because it resolves the main di-
lemma of the Keynesian logical probability theory with regard to subjectivism. 
Hársing perceptively concludes that the “accusation” of subjectivism levelled at 
Keynes is not based on the fact that Keynes defines logical probability as the de-
gree of rational belief. He believes that the expression “degree of rational belief” is 
misleading, and although it creates the impression of subjectivism, in reality the 
substance of this concept, for Keynes, is objective:the degree to which the hypoth-
eses are founded. For him, subjectivism stems from the fact that he regards the 
concept of logical probability as exclusive, and also extends it to the description 
of objective phenomena. Ultimately, this leads to a rejection of probabilities that 
are totally independent of human consciousness, and to the subjectivisation of 
objective phenomena (Hársing, 1965:951).
The use of mathematical probability calculus presupposes the measurability of 
probabilities. In his treatise, Keynes (1921) denied that all probabilities are numer-
ically measurable or suitable for positioning on a standardised scale of sizes. In 
his later work, Keynes (1937) claims that probabilities associated with the relative-
ly distant future are not measurable; he mentions that things like “the prospect of 
a European war” or “the rate of interest twenty years hence”, are so uncertain that 
“there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. 
We simply do not know.” (Keynes, 1937:213–214). The probability of events that 
influence the growth of capital cannot be measured either. Accordingly, nor can 
the present value of current investments be reliably calculated.
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Kay (2012) concurs with Skidelsky, who believed that understanding Keynes’s ap-
proach to probability is the key to understanding the rest of his work. Keynes 
believed the financial and business environment to be characterised by “radical 
uncertainty”. The only credible answer to the question of “what will interest rates 
be in twenty years’ time” is “we simply don’t know”9.
Hársing (1971b) emphatically points out that Keynes does not limit probability 
calculation to the analysis of games of chance and insurance transactions, and 
even if it means partially relinquishing the quantitative aspect, he attempts to re-
tain the original broadness of the concept of probability. (It should be noted that 
probability calculus, as a mathematical theory, emerged as a result of the work of 
B. Pascal és Jacob Bernoulli in relation to the analysis of the outcomes of games of 
chance) (Hársing, op. cit. 242).
It is generally accepted that Keynes’s concept of logical probability is “of a com-
parative nature”. This necessarily follows from the effort to elaborate a logical 
theory of probability that was more exact than before, without narrowing the 
definition of probability. Keynes resisted excluding, from the theory, probabilities 
that did not lend themselves to quantitative evaluation. He wrote the following 
on this:
“I maintain …. that there are some pairs of probabilities between the members 
of which no comparison of magnitude is possible; that we can say, neverthe-
less, of some pairs of relations of probability that the one is greater and the 
other less, although it is not possible to measure the difference between them; 
and that in a very special type of case … a meaning can be given to a numeri-
cal comparison of magnitude” (Keynes, 1921:34).
Keynes generally uses his concept of probability in the comparative sense, but he 
does not rule out the possibility of a quantitative interpretation in special cases.10
Brady (1983:27) points out that Keynes does not oppose the attempt to approach 
probability with an estimate that is subject to lower or higher barriers or limits. 
This argument is related to the following quote, taken from Keynes:
9 Kay (2012) believes that this was forward-looking and prescient commentary on the part of 
Keynes. Twenty years before publication of the TP we find ourselves in 1941, when Great Britain, 
at a critical stage of the Second World War, is engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival. 
Keynes saw the future more clearly than most, but when it came to what specific events would 
take place, he simply did not know. Like everyone else.
10 Hársing (1971) believes that Keynes clearly saw the paradox of scientific theory whereby an in-
crease in the exactness of definitions (the “arming” of definitions) usually leads to a narrowing 
of their scope. Based on examples from court proceedings and betting, he reaches the conclusion 
that in most cases the concept of probability can only be used in a comparative sense.
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“It is evident that the cases in which exact numerical measurement is pos-
sible are a very limited class … The sphere of inexact numerical comparison 
is not, however, quite so limited. Many probabilities, which are incapable of 
numerical measurement, can be placed ... between numerical limits. And by 
taking particular non-numerical probabilities as standards a great number of 
comparisons or approximate measurements become possible. If we can place 
a probability in an order of magnitude with some standard probability, we 
can obtain its approximate measure by comparison” (Keynes, 1921:176; cited 
in Brady, 1983).
Keynes – in addition to this – presents supplementary corroboration for his own 
logical theory of probability:
“In fact underwriters themselves distinguish between risks which are prop-
erly insurable, either because their probability can be estimated between 
comparatively narrow numerical limits or because it is possible to make a 
“book” which covers all possibilities, and other risks which cannot be dealt 
with in this way and which cannot form the basis of a regular business of 
insurance – although an occasional gamble may be indulged in. I believe, 
therefore, that the practice of underwriters weakens rather than supports the 
contention that all probabilities can be measured and estimated numerically” 
(Keynes, 1921:24).
Arthmar–Brady (2016), assessing Keynes’s breakthrough based on his logical 
theory of probability, highlights that Keynes’s theory of probability is a logical, 
objective epistemic approach that is based on partial rather than on complete 
resolution. These results can be specified and operationalised in the form of 
any kind of logical premises. This can easily be applied to unique events, non-
recurring events, irreversible events, singular events, infrequent events, frequent 
events, path dependency, sensitivity to initial conditions, emergencies, complex 
reasoning, attractive states, partial uncertainty or irreducible uncertainty, based 
on Keynes’s analysis of the weight of evidence.
Faced with the fact that after his TP of 1921, Keynes neither published any new 
work on logical probability nor took part in the continued development of the 
logical probability school of thought – initiated by him – we have to agree with 
Hársing’s (1971b:242) conclusion that Keynes regarded the creation of his pre-
ferred version of logical probability as being important as a means of underpin-
ning the results of his specialist (economics) research.11
11 Although the Treatise on Probability was not published until 1921, it was essentially complete 
ten years earlier. This was the period in which Keynes developed his ideas on probability, and 
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Keynes pitted the complete future knowledge of classical economics against 
uncertainty. In what follows, we seek the answer to the question how close the 
relationship is, in Keynes’s seminal works, between his own theory of probabil-
ity and his theory of economics, and of whether continuity of thinking can be 
demonstrated between the Treatise on Probability (1921) and the General Theory 
(1936). To decide this, we must first take a closer look at the role of uncertainty in 
Keynes’s conceptual framework.
4  THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY  
IN THE KEYNESIAN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Uncertainty is a central category in Keynes’s (1921) seminal work on probability, 
in which he describes this concept and phenomenon as multidimensional. Uncer-
tainty features in this work with two independent definitions, with the two mean-
ings deriving from the concepts of probability and weight. O’Donnell – invoking 
the model of logical probability – says that when the true value of a statement is 
unknown, we resort to its probability to indicate – with regard to the evidence 
provided – the appropriate degree of rational belief. This definition of uncertainty 
has a at its centre. But in an entirely difference sense this also lies in the centre 
of h, which relates to the degree of completeness of the relevant information on 
which the argument is based. We know that the data in our possession are not 
complete, and we are also uncertain as to the extent of this incompleteness. The 
uncertainty – in this sense – stems from the partial lack of relevant knowledge 
(O’Donnell, 1999a:259).
Rosser (2001) believed that Keynes’s conception of uncertainty developed para-
doxically over time. One reason for this was that Keynes presented several differ-
ent arguments relating to uncertainty, encapsulating certain shifts in his views, 
increasingly emphasising that the chief characteristic of uncertainty is unquanti-
fiable nature. Nevertheless, the starting point was his TP published in 1921, which 
served as the basis for his later views.
Keynes’s article (1937) gives the most characterful explanation of uncertainty as 
he perceived it. Keynes started with “the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence” (1937:214), and then went on:
“About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calcu-
lable probability whatever. We simply do not know. Nevertheless, the neces-
therefore it significantly predates his work on the role of uncertainty in economics (Cf. Ham-
ouda–Smithin, 1988).
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sity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best 
to overlook this awkward fact and to behave exactly as we should if we had 
behind us a good Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages 
and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to 
be summed.”
Keynes deals with four versions of uncertainty, which means that he himself dif-
ferentiated between the various degrees of uncertainty and did not consider fun-
damental uncertainty to be the only variant. The first group consists of events that 
have unknown outcomes, and an ex ante probability rate (or distribution). These 
are the sources of “probability knowledge”.
A paradigmatic example of this is gambling in a casino. For Keynes, the source of 
the probability rate is compatible with the frequency approach, as well as with the 
objective interpretation of probability. The second version – unlike the previous 
one – means uncertain events where there is no “scientific basis” whatsoever for 
the probability rate. These are events that are beyond scientific knowledge, re-
garding which only unsubstantiated estimates can be made. According to Knight 
(1921:225), this is always the case when dealing with decisions made under unique 
circumstances.
As the third group, Keynes concedes that there are events which lie between the 
two extremes; as an example, he puts forward events that have no fixed ex ante 
probability rate, but are subjected to a credibly informed scientific analysis with 
a variable degree of certainty. The fourth is a version that is applied for practi-
cal reasons when uncertain events are treated as cases of probable knowledge 
although, from a theoretical perspective, such an act cannot be proven. (cf. Back-
house–Bateman. 2006).
A comparison of the three seminal works gives an example of the changing sub-
stance of Keynesian uncertainty. In his GT of 1936, Keynes discusses “irreducible 
uncertainty”, an in his correspondence with Townshend in 1938, “unrankable un-
certainty”. the first concept, “low weight uncertainty” appeared in Keynes’s (1936) 
work. By “very uncertain” Keynes does not mean “very improbable” (Keynes, 
1936:148 and Note 1). O’Donnell points out that, as a consequence of this, very 
uncertain corresponds to a very low weight; that is, situations in which there is 
a lack of completeness of the relevant information. The second, or “irreducible” 
meaning of radical uncertainty features in Keynes’s (1937) work. The key to this 
concept is Keynes’s doctrine of “unknown probability”. According to Keynes, the 
meaning of this is that we “simply do not know”; in other words, individuals have 
no knowledge of probabilities. The actors, owing to insufficient logical insight, are 
deprived of the ability to perceive the probability relationship. This is not due to 
any deficiency of intellect; in situations where h is exceptionally small, not even 
highly intelligent actors have the mental capacity for solving the logical relation-
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ship between a and h. This context presents a good example of the power of hu-
man reasoning when scant data is available. In such cases, the uncertainty does 
not lend itself to being reduced to probability. The third is the “unrankable” ver-
sion of uncertainty that comes from Keynes’s correspondence with Townshend12, 
and which refers to the impossibility of generating a complete ranking (cardinal 
or ordinal) of alternative courses of action. This impossibility is related to the 
existence of incomparability between the probable values.
Given such a wide variety of definitions of uncertainty, Koppl (1991) justifiably 
concludes that it is difficult to make a credible judgement based on uncertainty, 
especially given fundamental (radical) uncertainty, which Keynes emphasised in 
his (1921) and (1937) works in keeping with the weight of the argument. When 
knowledge is “uncertain”, people are not capable of estimating probability, or at 
least not credibly; and they cannot demand more knowledge about the future. 
When knowledge is “uncertain”, it is not possible to obtain a good Benthamite 
calculation of future value, whether in the moral, hedonic or economic sense. 
If the uncertainty is sufficiently large, then we simply do not know (Keynes, 
1937:213–214). When this version of uncertainty is present, the rational basis for 
action is substantially weakened. The “animal spirit” is needed to prevent eco-
nomic actors from being stymied in their operation.
Rényi’s (1976) stance on the relationship between information and uncertainty 
gives an interesting illustration of the epistemic nature of uncertainty:
“As regards the concept of information, it is expedient (...) to introduce a re-
lated concept:the category of uncertainty. The result of an experiment whose 
outcome depends on the random is, to a greater or lesser degree, uncertain. 
Upon performing the experiment, this uncertainty ceases. The remaining un-
certainty regarding the result of the experiment can be measured with the 
quantity of information that we obtain (on average) by conducting the experi-
ment. The uncertainty, therefore, can be perceived as an information deficit 
(uncertainty is negative information), or conversely:we can interpret informa-
12 Townshend’s correspondence with Keynes started on 7 April 1937. Keynes provided Townshend 
with an extremely important clue to the mystery, which went unnoticed. “But a main point to 
which I would call your attention is that, on my theory of probability, the probabilities themselves, 
quite apart from their weight or value, are not numerical. So that, even apart from this particular 
point of weight, the substitution of a numerical measure needs discussion” (Keynes, 1979:289, cited 
in Brady, 2018). Keynes was explaining that the theory of probability that he applied in the GT 
in 1936, and which Townshend and Keynes were discussing in the letter of April 1937, was the 
theory of logical probability combined with the weighting of evidence. According to Keynes, the 
probabilities have to be non-numerical and indefinite by necessity in millions of cases; however, 
the non-numerical probabilities relate to the probability interval (Brady, 2018).
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tion as the elimination or reduction of uncertainty (information is negative 
uncertainty)”.13
Most interpretations of uncertainty are epistemic, a good example of this being 
Davidson’s (1982) opinion that in reality there are many situations in which we 
are faced with “true” uncertainty regarding the future consequences of today’s 
choices. In such cases, the decision-makers see that neither today’s expenditure 
on the analysis of past data nor the present market indicators can be expected to 
offer reliable statistical or intuitive assistance in foretelling the future.
Recent decades have seen a growing recognition that uncertainty also has certain 
ontological aspects. If fundamental uncertainty is assumed, future states cannot 
be specified because these will be established now and in the future. This suggests 
that future states cannot be anticipated. Something that has happened in the past 
or is happening in the present will not necessarily also occur in the future. It is 
the irreversible and open nature of time and the malleability of the future, not the 
limited capabilities of the economic actors that lead individual actors to disregard 
the possible patterns of action or future states. Dunn (2000:428) stresses that indi-
viduals are the builders of the future. In an uncertain world, the future – prior to 
its formation – cannot be known, regardless of the calculation abilities attributed 
to individuals. It is not possible to know, ex ante, how any story will develop, and 
it matters not how much information and computing capacity a decision-maker 
has, the future can never be predicted ex ante with certainty (of probability).
In addition to the conditions of uncertainty, the expectations on which the de-
cision rests are also dependent on the imagination and on intelligence, and on 
the narratives by which they are communicated; and they encapsulate feelings 
and emotions. According to Bronk (2009:221), imagination and creativity are not 
merely the main causes of ontological uncertainty, they are also important tools 
for describing uncertainty...  The future has no precise vision, since this will be 
determined subsequently with innovations that have not yet been discovered and 
with decisions that have not yet been made, as well as the opportunities in this 
regard; market valuations only reflect our best views, the preferred narratives and 
the fleeting attitudes of optimism and pessimism (op. cit. 258).
13 A reduction in uncertainty can be interpreted as information, but a change in unexpectedness is 
not information; only the expected value of this quantity can be accepted as a quantity of infor-
mation, and only because it is equivalent to a decrease in uncertainty (Rényi, 1976).
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5 ANIMAL SPIRITS, EXPECTATIONS, INVESTMENT DECISIONS
5.1 The introduction of animal spirits
Animal spirits are a key category in Keynes’s (1936) seminal work on economics. 
According to Koppl (1991), animal spirits come into the frame as a cause of action 
on the one hand, and as a subsequent source of instability on the other. Keynes 
believes that most of our actions cannot derive from “a mathematical expecta-
tion, whether moral or hedonistic or economic”. Keynes felt that “most, probably, 
of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be 
drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spir-
its” (Keynes, 1936:161). He defined animal spirits as “a spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction” (1936:161)14.
Although Keynes saw the main thrust of the individual’s behaviour as being to 
maintain a rational economic face, he was also aware of the limitations on the at-
tainability of such. He saw the reasons for these as follows:
“Knowing that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavour to 
fall back on the judgment of the rest of the world which is perhaps better in-
formed. That is, we endeavour to conform with the behaviour of the major-
ity or the average. the psychology of a society of individuals each of whom is 
endeavouring to copy the others leads to what we may strictly term a conven-
tional judgment” (Keynes, 1937:214).
According to Keynes, a lack of information and the general uncertainty of the 
future prevent entrepreneurs from forming scientific or rational expectations; 
but if they need to act, they substitute this with conventional expectations which 
then determine their investment decisions. However, precisely because this ex-
pectation is largely conventional, it is vulnerable to waves of optimism or pessi-
mism, and the general state is the famous animal spirits (cf. Keynes, 1936:161–162). 
Keynes also warns that the actions inducted by the animal spirits are fundamen-
tally irrational. He believed that rational action and probability are inseparable 
phenomena. In the relevant passage of his treatise, Keynes (1921:351) writes that 
“the probable is the hypothesis on which it is rational for us to act.” People who 
are driven forward by animal spirits are not controlled by a more or less likely 
esimate; in this sense, their actions are irrational. Keynes took the view that ra-
tional actions must be based on rational belief. When people revert to the animal 
14 Keynes’s train of thought continues as follows: “Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the 
spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, 
enterprise will fade and die – though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes 
of profit had before” (Keynes, 1936: 162).
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spirits, they are not acting on the basis of beliefs that are considered to be rational. 
Therefore, their actions are not rational.
Based on the foregoing, Koppl (1991) justifiably asks whether we need to take ani-
mal spirits seriously in economics. If we do, then is this not abandonment of an 
economic theory that is based on rationality? There is some evidence to suggest 
that “irrationalities” matter from time to time. The story of economic bubbles 
shows that investor behaviour is sometimes justifiably labelled as “irrational”, be-
cause it can and does influence market processes. Koppl emphasises that there is 
no proof that people are irrational by nature. Rather, the signs show that it may 
be useful to take the animal spirits seriously, seeking those economic conditions 
under which the impulsive side of human nature counts, and those conditions 
under which it does not.
Keynes asserts that the lack of information, and general uncertainty regarding 
the future, make it impossible for the decision-makers to form rational expecta-
tions, and this fact is pivotal with respect to their investment decisions. On this 
basis, Keynes does not conclude that every single actor forms his or her individual 
expectations that differ from those of all the other actors. Indeed, upon closer 
examination precisely the opposite is the case:the actors emulate each other, and 
thus they are members of a group whose members represent more or less the same 
viewpoint. This type of expectation, however, is based not on calculations, but on 
factors such as, for example, the state of the animal spirits. Rosser (2001) views the 
Keynesian perception of uncertainty as a fundamental and unquantifiable phe-
nomenon to be the basis for why the “bird on the wing” of real capital investment 
is directed not by long-term rational expectations, which would not even be pos-
sible, but is driven by the essentially subjective and ultimately “irrational” animal 
spirits, a spontaneous urge to action in the face of uncertainty.
Hodgson (1985:13) confirms that irrational decision-making stems not from hu-
man nature, but from the circumstances surrounding the decision and action. 
He writes the following on this:“according to Keynes, human beings are rational 
but they live in a world where widespread uncertainty places severe limits on the 
capacities of individuals to make detailed, rational calculations about the future. 
These constraints derive not from the limited rationality of individuals but from 
the ubiquitousness of uncertainty”.
5.2 The role of expectations
Keynes makes a sharp distinction between short-term and long-term expecta-
tions. A short-term expectation “is concerned with the price which a manufac-
turer can expect to get for his ‘finished’ output given his general productive capa-
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bilities.” It is thus very different from long-term expectation which is concerned 
with what the entrepreneur can hope to earn in the shape of future returns if 
he purchases ‘finished’ output as an addition to his capital equipment” (Butos-
Koppl, 1995:46–47). From these definitions, Keynes concluded that a company’s 
daily output depends on its short-term expectations, whereas its investment in 
new capital is a function of long-term expectations.
Keynes’s theory of long-term expectations is based on his rationalism, and states 
that there is very little correspondence between expectations and the economic 
events. According to Butos–Koppl (1995), Keynes believed that economic expec-
tations are subjective. However, the subjectivity of the expectations has more 
pronounced consequences in the case of long-term expectations than in the case 
of short-term expectations. While short-term expectations are closely associated 
with the realised values, long-term expectations are not formed by a rational cal-
culation, because they do not “rest on an adequate or secure foundation”. (Keynes, 
1937:218). All this leads us to conclude that, in his view, long-term expectations 
cannot establish a systematic relationship with fundamental economic reality.
Butos–Koppl (1995:59) perceptively concludes that, for Keynes, expectations 
regarding the future are states of belief. If these belief states reliably direct ex-
pectations, then they embody credible knowledge; but the reliable prediction 
of the future is not possible. “We cannot make any ‘calculated mathematical 
expectation(s)” of future values, writes Keynes (1936:152), then goes on to say that 
“in a world where people plan for the future (...) most action is irrational action. 
‘Most probably, of our decisions to do something positive,’ Keynes believed, “the 
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only 
be taken as a result of animal spirits, a spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction” (op. cit. 161). Keynes only gave actions the opportunity to “struggle with 
the dark forces of time and our ignorance of the future” (1936:157).Thus – accord-
ing to Keynes – on modern asset markets, speculators’ long-term expectations 
create an atmosphere that generates nihilistic waves of pessimism and optimism 
that translate into waves of greater and lesser investment spending.
5.3 The investment decision
In his seminal economics work, Keynes (1936) dealt – in relation to long-term ex-
pectations (cf. Chapter 12) – with the knowledge of the future that could be neces-
sary for making correct decisions and encouraging capital projects; he concluded 
that, because a certain knowledge of the future is unattainable, by their nature 
decisions relating to capital projects have to be based on a belief in the foundation 
of knowledge, which is flimsy at best.
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Coddington (1982) believes that Keynes, in the context of the GT, presents uncer-
tainty as an inherent part of investment decisions. This is the reason for Keynes’s 
assertion that the foundation of knowledge for investments in the private sector 
is flimsy. The following passage (which we have already invoked more than once) 
sheds light on Keynes’s concept of uncertainty:
“The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a Eu-
ropean war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty 
years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, of the position of pri-
vate wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there 
is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever” 
(Keynes, 1937:214).
Investment decisions are based on beliefs regarding future circumstances which, 
however, have to be based on the conditions of the present and past. According-
ly, investment behaviour may show capricious fluctuations either as the present 
conditions change unpredictably, leading to irregular fluctuation with regard to 
anticipated future conditions, or through changes in the beliefs forming the basis 
for the decisions, without any corresponding changes in the actual conditions. 
Of these two scenarios, it is the second that leads to autonomous volatility in the 
aggregated expenditure arising from investment decisions. 
In keeping with this, Coddington (1982:481) maintains that if changes in private 
investment are rooted in the spontaneous and capricious functioning of the hu-
man mind, then there is a solution to Keynes’s problem:such a cataloguing would 
provides the reason why this type of expenses fluctuates autonomously instead 
of responding to changes in objective circumstances. This is the way in which 
subjectivist ideas show themselves in Keynes’s GT.
It’s worth pointing out that, from the perspective of the Keynesian argument, it is 
not really the fact of the uncertainty that is important, but rather how individu-
als are likely to react to the fact of the uncertainty. Accordingly, if the investment 
decisions are shrouded in great uncertainty, manufacturers respond to this for 
as long as possible by making the same investment decisions during this period 
as they did in the previous one (because the results of the previous decisions are 
what the decision-makers know something about). This does not result in great-
er stability than could be expected from complex calculations performed on a 
cognitive basis using privileged beliefs, or from forecasts with an indeterminate 
background. On this basis, the fact of uncertainty does not in itself lead to conclu-
sions regarding the voluntary and unchecked behaviour of specified macroeco-
nomic variables.
We have to agree with Weintraub’s (1975) conclusion that Keynes made a break-
through in economics with his GT, specifically by making the relationship be-
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tween uncertainty and investment explicit; and the theoretical core of this re-
lationship was already present in the TP.15 Another aspect of this theoretical 
innovation was that Keynes moved beyond games of chance and applied the lan-
guage of probability to real decision-making situations. When evaluating alter-
native courses of action, individuals are driven by their views regarding the most 
probable outcome. The outcomes are manifest in the future; but they cannot be 
observed in the present. In this regard, Keynes considered it important to under-
line the following:
“The theory can be summed up by saying that, given the psychology of the 
public, the level of output and employment as a whole depends on the amount 
of investments [although a few other factors may influence output] ... it is they 
which are influenced by our views of the future about which we know so little 
(Keynes, 1937:221).
Keynes treated as fact the phenomena whereby 1) capital assets are long-lasting, 
2) the desire to hoard money reflects the degree of our mistrust of the future, and 
3) production needs time. These are all facts associated with a world in which 
time is important. In the course of our previous reasoning it became clear that 
time and uncertainty are intertwined; the former inevitably attracts the latter. 
Weintraub concludes that Keynes’s system was dynamic in the traditional sense 
that it includes time as a material factor; thus, if investments are volatile due to 
uncertainty, there is not level of output or employment that can always be main-
tained. This is why Weintraub calls uncertainty an equilibrium phenomenon and 
can declare that Keynes was concerned with equilibrium problems (Weintraub, 
1975:541).
Keynes believed that business calculations are deeply unreliable:“the outstanding 
fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our esti-
mates of prospective yield have to be made” (Keynes, 1936:76). Keynes believed 
that the incompetence of long-term expectations did not cause difficulties in 
calmer times when corporate shares could not be “floated off on the Stock Ex-
change at an immediate profit”. (op. cit. 76). “Decisions to invest in private busi-
ness of the old-fashioned type were, however, decisions largely irrevocable, not 
only for the community as a whole, but also for the individual” (op. cit. 76). The 
entrepreneur’s attachment to his or her own capital might be seen as a burden on 
the investment when it’s precise present value cannot be calculated. But business 
ventures are not launched “merely as a result of cold calculation.” (op. cit. 76). 
15 According to Joan Robinson (1973:3) “On the plane of theory, [Keynes’s] revolution lay in the 
change from the principles of rational choice to the problems of decisions based on guesswork 
and convention.”
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Thus, the irrational element has a positive effect on human actions. The animal 
spirits prompt people to act in a way that is socially beneficial, motivating the 
individual to invest.
In Keynes’s opinion, the emergence of the stock exchange brought about a change, 
on which he wrote the following:“with the separation between ownership and 
management which prevails to-day and with the development of organised in-
vestment markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in, which some-
times facilitates investment but sometimes adds greatly to the instability of the 
system” (op. cit. 76). The new factor was speculation. The speculator does not try 
to measure present value, but the share price of the near future. Because the pre-
sent value calculation is largely false, the speculator’s estimates have no ground-
ing in any assumed market reality on which they are based. Keynes argues that 
the professional trader wants to know the forthcoming changes in current asset 
prices and is not interested in long-term values.16
Investments associated with fundamental decisions become volatile, and concur-
rently with this the changes in expectations become substantial forces in the de-
termination of economic activities.
For Keynes, the operationalisation of economic activity takes place by the cal-
endar of historical time:When making their decisions, economic actors use the 
irreversibility of the past and the unpredictability of the future as references. In 
the words of Keynes himself, this can be expressed as follows:“… philosophically 
speaking, it cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not 
provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. In point of 
fact, all sorts of considerations enter into the market valuation which are in no 
way relevant to the prospective yield” (Keynes, 1936:77). In line with Keynes’s 
opinion, the long-term expectations on which our decisions are based do not only 
16 Black’s (1986) paper introduces a modern version of speculative trading, which rhymes well 
with Keynes’s description from his own era. “In my model of the way we observe the world, noise 
is what makes our observations imperfect. It keeps us from knowing the expected return on a 
stock or portfolio. (...) Noise makes financial markets possible, but also makes them imperfect. 
If there is no noise trading, there will be very little trading in individual assets. I do not believe 
it makes sense to create a model with information trading but no noise trading where traders 
have different beliefs and one trader’s beliefs are as good as any other trader’s beliefs. Differences 
in beliefs must derive ultimately from differences in information. A trader with a special piece 
of information will know that other traders have their own special pieces of information and 
will therefore not automatically rush out to trade. Noise trading provides the essential missing 
ingredient. Noise trading is trading on noise as if it were information. People who trade on noise 
are willing to trade even though from an objective point of view they would be better off not trad-
ing. Perhaps they think the noise they are trading on is information. Or perhaps they just like to 
trade” (op. cit. 529–531).
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depend on our most likely forecast; they are also just as dependent on the confi-
dence with which that forecast has been made.
Although long-term expectations remain constant for a long time, they are nev-
ertheless exposed to sudden and violent changes that may at times be caused by 
(sometimes irrational) speculation, although they can also be triggered by psy-
chological changes. Keynes – as we have shown above – presents his own theory 
in the form of “animal spirits”. He claims that these are the forces behind capital 
investments:“a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not ... the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities” (Keynes, op. cit. 81).
6  CONTINUITY OR DISCONTINUITY  
IN THE ROLE OF PROBABILITY IN THE KEYNESIAN 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The question of how Keynes’s GT relates to the fundamental premise of his main 
work on probability, the TP, has been open and disputes for many long decades. 
Gillies (1988) takes the view that, upon first consideration, the relationship could 
be very loose, because in the TP Keynes identified probability as the degree of 
rational belief. The degree of rational belief was a given for a, and for b it was 
something that can be calculated as a purely logical relationship, and this was the 
same for all rational individuals. This setup is very far removed from the influ-
ence of the animal spirits. Gillies nevertheless believes that there are passages of 
the TP that give a foretaste of what the GT has to say. Where Keynes discusses the 
measurement of probability the TP, he bases his reasoning on examples such as 
“quotes at Lloyd’s” (op. cit. 23), and he concludes that “no exercise of the practi-
cal judgment is possible, by which a numerical value can actually be given to the 
probability of every argument” (op. cit. 29).
Sharp differences of opinion emerged as to whether “there was continuity or 
whether there was a break in continuity” following Keynes’s 1921 TP. On one side 
there was the opinion that Keynes – chiefly in response to Ramsey’s criticism – 
switched from logical probability to a subjective probability approach (Bateman, 
1987). The other side came to be dominated by a belief that Keynes did not adapt 
any alternative probability method that differed from logical probability, but con-
tinued his work within the original framework of the TP. This position is most 
assertively represented by O’Donnell (1990).
There is a marked difference between Keynes’s (1921) and Ramsey’s (1931) con-
ception of probability, and this influences debates on the topic to this day. Ram-
sey was the first to describe the applicability of a subjective feeling as a means 
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of interpretation. He looked upon this approach as being complementary to the 
frequency interpretation of probability, which was an established theory at that 
time. Ramsey emphasised the measurability of the probability relationship. He 
believed it was possible to arrive at probability values with a behavioural experi-
ment; that is, he viewed reliance on the betting process as an aid for determining 
belief. In Ramsey’s view, belief can only be measured through a study of behav-
iour, and there is no sense in differentiating between the measurable and the non-
measurable component (risk and uncertainty), because even if such a distinction 
is relevant, on a theoretical basis there is no adequate reason for avoiding the 
quantification of this segment, because the degree of belief is suitable for meas-
urement. Ramsey anyway ruled out a priori knowledge of the probability of a 
claim:all he conceded was that the present feelings, paired with a knowledge of 
the observed evidence, can lead back to the initial feeling. Therefore, this initial 
feeling can be determined a posteriori. This was the ideological basis for Ramsey’s 
(1926) severe criticism of the interpretation of logic articulated by Keynes. The 
following passage from Ramsey is often quoted to support this:17
“But let us now return to a more fundamental criticism of Mr Keynes’s views, 
which is the obvious one that there really do not seem to be any such things as 
the probability relations he describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain 
cases, they can be perceived; but speaking for myself I feel confident that this 
is not true. I do not perceive them, and if I am to be persuaded that they ex-
ist it must be by argument; moreover I shrewdly suspect that others do not 
perceive them either, because they are able to come to so very little agreement 
as to which of them relates to any two given propositions” (Ramsey, 1926:161).
The main thrust of Ramsey’s criticism was that the version of the probability rela-
tion discussed by Keyes simply does not exist, and Ramsey’s own procedure (bet-
ting) makes it much easier to find the “degrees of belief” held by people.
Keynes (1933), in an essay honouring Ramsey (after his death in 1930), wrote the 
following in response to Ramsey’s criticism:
“Ramsey argues, as against the view which I had put forward, that probability 
is concerned not with objective relations between propositions but (in some 
sense) with degrees of belief, and he succeeds in showing that the calculus of 
probabilities simply amounts to a set of rules for ensuring that the system of 
degrees of belief which we hold shall be a consistent system. Thus the calculus 
of probabilities belongs to formal logic. But the basis of our degrees of belief – 
or the a priori probabilities, as they used to be called – is part of our human 
17 Ramsey first critiqued Keynes’s (1921) TP in his book review published in the 1922 issue of Cam-
bridge Magazine, and later in his essay Truth and Probability, published in 1926.
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outfit, perhaps given us by natural selection, analogous to our perceptions 
and our memories rather than to formal logic. So far I yield to Ramsey – I 
think he is right. But in attempting to distinguish ‘rational’ degrees of belief 
from belief he was not yet, I think, quite successful” (Keynes, 1933:300–301).
On this basis, it is safe to say that Keynes was prepared to accept Ramsey’s opin-
ion on several points; but it was clear that the two of them did not agree on every-
thing. Bateman (1987) commented, on Keynes’s views regarding probability, that 
Keynes had adopted a subjective interpretation of probability. After the above 
Keynes quote, Bateman, wrote the following:
“While Keynes (1921) had originally advocated an objective epistemic theory 
or probability, he was not willing to accept a subjective epistemic theory...” 
(Bateman, 1987:107).
What is less debatable with regard to Bateman’s opinion is that Keynes moved 
away from the logical interpretation of probability; however, the direction and 
extent of that shift demands more detailed argumentation, especially in view of 
Keynes’s theoretical position thus established. We should be clear that all Keynes 
wrote in his reply to Ramsey was that Ramsey was right to say that the “degree of 
belief” is essentially rooted in human nature and not in form logic.
As regards the question of continuity or discontinuity, we should regard O’ Don-
nell’s view on this as definitive. He made two assertions:firstly, Keynes’s thinking 
continued to be based on the framework assumptions of the TP; secondly, there was 
an internal shift within the constraints of these assumptions after 1931, whereby 
the importance of the indeterminate domain and the weight of weak rational-
ity increased, while the significance of the determinate domain and the strong 
rationality decreased.18
Gillies (1988) also poses the question of whether Keynes’s view on probability 
changed over the years. He concludes that Ramsey’s criticism of Keynes’s views 
moved Keynes into an intermediate position between his original logical inter-
pretation of probability and Ramsey’s subjective probability theory. Gillies de-
fines Keynes’s new theoretical position as constructing a so-called intersubjective 
probability theory, making use of Keynes views on the long-term expectations of 
entrepreneurs. Due to the lack of information and to general uncertainty, compa-
nies have a tendency to copy each other, following the crowd, and thus amplifying 
the “animal spirits” which Keynes describes as often being the cause of sudden 
18 O’Donnell (1990b), albeit without providing an explanation, nevertheless claimed that there 
is strong evidence for the shift of emphasis in Keynesian thinking that was already running its 
course – like an underground – in the mid-1920s. He believes that Ramsey’s effect on Keynes was 
to reinforce this trend.
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changes in economic activity. Based on the foregoing, we can state that Keynes 
was closer to the intersubjective epistemic theory than the subjective epistemic 
theory championed by Ramsey. Lawson (1985) rightfully concludes that intersub-
jective probability was closer to Keynes’s earlier thinking, and a group of inter-
subjective probability occupies an intermediate position between rational belief 
(early Keynesian thinking) and subjective belief (Ramsey).
An important point of Ramsey’s (1926) criticism was the dismissal of the principle 
of indifference; with regard to this he notes the following:
“To be able to turn the Principle of Indifference out of formal logic is a great 
advantage; for it is fairly clearly impossible to lay down purely logical condi-
tions for its validity, as is attempted by Mr Keynes” (Ramsey, 1926:189).
This opinion may have had a role in the fact that Keynes, who based the TP’s 
whole train of thought on the principle of indifference, completely repudiated 
this principle in the GT. Keynes wrote the following on this in his seminal work 
of economics:
“Nor can we rationalise our behaviour by arguing that to a man in a state of 
ignorance errors in either direction are equally probable, so that there remains 
a mean actuarial expectation based on equi-probabilities. For it can easily be 
shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal probabilities based on a 
state of ignorance leads to absurdities.” (Keynes, 1936:152).
Gillies (1998) also points out that Keynes still did not capitulate to Ramsey, and 
he had doubts as to whether Ramsey provided a satisfactory explanation for the 
differentiation between the degree of belief and the degrees of rational believe. 
Keynes’s original probabilities; that is, the degrees of rational belief, where the 
same in respect of all existing individuals. Ramsey’s probabilities or degrees of 
subjective belief were associated with a given individual, and thus they changed 
from one individual to the next. The expectations of entrepreneurs in a given 
economy, in keeping with Keynes’s later theory, occupied a position somewhere 
between the two. In his review of the TP, Ramsey (1922) asserted that probability 
must be precise, exact and mathematical. According to Brady (2018), Ramsey’s 
criticism prompted Keynes to emphasise even more strongly the individual’s own 
opinion as the basis for the probability calculation, and he was less emphatic that 
this belief was rational. However, Keynes’s theory did not stand or fall on the 
opinion regarding the degree of our belief as a logical relation. The core of his 
theory – in terms of when and how we are capable of measuring and comparing 
the various probabilities – did not change. Unlike Ramsey, he was by no means 
certain that probabilities are always one-dimensional, measurable, quantifiable 
or comparable entities.
loGIcal ProBaBIlIty, uncertaInty, Investment DecIsIons 31
Since Ramsey believed firmly that every probability is a numerical value, he re-
garded Keynes’s probability theory, both as a whole and in its details, as being a 
purely qualitative interpretation; and thus he reasons that in the absence of num-
bers Keynes’s analysis is merely a qualitative and comparative analysis that can 
only be applied with limitations. The question of whether this perceived relation-
ship between Keynes’s early work (TP) and his later uncertainty conception rep-
resented continuity or discontinuity is discussed in-Depth by Lawson (1985:914). 
There is, however, a thread of the problem that receives very little attention. 
Hamouda–Smithin (1988) attributes particular important to the position taken 
by Keynes, emphasising the fundamental difference in treatment of the topic un-
der study between the natural sciences and the so-called “moral” sciences (social 
science), and thus its suitability, which Keynes described in connection with his 
“atomic” and “organic” hypotheses. A study of this aspect helps us understand 
the role of uncertainty in social relations, and also contributes to acceptance of 
Lawson’s theory of “social interactionism” (Lawson, 1985:926).
Here, moving beyond the dichotomy of continuity versus discontinuity, we will 
examine the evolutionary process in which items that were present in the TP, but 
later evolved in Keynes’s subsequent works, were adapted specifically for econom-
ics; namely, the applicability of the atomic hypothesis in the moral; that is, the 
social sciences.
According to the TP, the most important types of arguments used for establishing 
probability relations are induction and analogy. The basis for Keynes’s mode of 
reasoning is the atomic theory, which he describes as follows (Keynes, 1921:287):
“The system of the material universe must consist, is this kind of assumption 
is warranted, of bodies which we may term ... legal atoms, such that each of 
them exercises its own separate, independent and invariable effect, a change 
of the total state being compounded of a number of separate changes each of 
which is solely due to a separate portion of the preceding state. ... Each atom 
can ... be treated as a separate cause and does not enter into difference organic 
combinations in each of which it is regulated by different laws.”
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the atomic theory is not confirmed, and 
Keynes describes this case as follows:
“Yet there might well be quite different laws for wholes of different degrees of 
complexity, and laws of connections between complexes which could not be 
stated in terms of laws connecting individual parts. In this case natural law 
would be organic and not, as it is generally supposed, atomic” (op. cit. 287).
Hamouda–Smithin ponts out that the above quotes contain no reference to eco-
nomic or social science. In other parts of the TP, Keynes expresses the opinion 
that a clear distinction must be made between the natural sciences and the moral 
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or social sciences; and the atomic hypothesis may have a role in the former at any 
time, it is categorically inappropriate in the latter. On this, Keynes wrote the fol-
lowing in the TP:
“The atomic hypothesis which has worked so splendidly in Physics breaks 
down in Psychics. We are faced at every turn with the problems of Organic 
Unity, of Discreteness, of Discontinuity – the whole is not equal to the sum of 
the party, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large effects, 
the assumptions of a uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied” 
(op. cit. 262).
Towards the end of the 1930s, Keynes returned to the atomic-organic dilemma 
that resulted from the process of change that occurred in Keynes’s conception of 
uncertainty between the mid-1920s and the end of the 1930s. During this period, 
Keynes’s view on uncertainty were “radicalised”; the role of indeterminateness 
and the fundamental grew. A letter dated August 1938 refers to this:
“If we are dealing with the action of numerically measurable independent 
forces, adequately analysed so that we were dealing with independent atomic 
factors, … we might be able to use the method of multiple correlation with 
some confidence. … In fact we know that every one of these conditions is far 
from being satisfied by the economic material under investigation” (cited in 
Hamouda–Smithin, 1988).
Based on the above quotations, Keynes clearly puts forward the view that the 
atomic hypothesis does not apply the world of social relations. The elements of 
this world do not function as “legal” atoms, striving to exert their own independ-
ent effect under all circumstances, but yield willingly to various laws in all the 
alternative configurations of the system. On this basis, Keynes’s view on uncer-
tainty can only be understood in relation to this vision of the social process.
7  COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBABILITY  
IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
7.1 The redefined idea of relative frequency
Classical probability theory– from the late 19th century – came in for criticism due 
to the non-fulfilment of the principle of indifference and the principle of additivi-
ty, and the narrow scope for application of the theory. The most forceful challenge 
to the classical interpretation of probability came from Keynes’s seminal work on 
probability, laying the foundations for the system of logical probability. The great 
thinkers’ differing views on probability point to a multiplication of probability 
conceptions. This is ultimately why competing concepts emerged as challengers 
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in the twentieth century. Most economics thinkers were relatively unaffected by 
this competition, and scholars of this discipline maintained their imprecisely de-
fined “objective” and “subjective” analyses.
Paradoxically, the challenging view that had the greatest impact was the “relative 
frequency” interpretation of probability put forward by Richard von Mises (1928) 
and Reichenbach (1961). The decline of the classical probability interpretation, and 
the emergence and spread of the science of statistics and mathematical statis-
tics, led to a new interpretation of probability which – building on a solid math-
ematical foundation – amounted to a redefinition of the doctrines of the classical 
probability theory. In this theory, probabilities are associated not with individual 
results but with event types, and the theory itself takes an objective approach. The 
essence of the new approach can be expressed almost exactly in the same way as 
that of the classical probability interpretation:Under the “relative frequency” ap-
proach, the probability of a given event is the relative frequency of its occurrence 
in any trial in an infinite chain of similar trials.
The basis of Richard von Mises’s probability theory is the concept of the collec-
tive. The rational conception of probability, in contrast to probability as used in 
everyday conversation, only receives a precise meaning if the collective to which 
it is applied is precisely defined in every case. This is when probability has a real 
meaning with respect to a given collective. The collective essentially consists of 
a series of observations that continue for an indefinite period. Every observation 
end with the recording of a certain property. The relative frequency with which a 
specified property occurs has a limiting value in the series of observations.
According to Hauwe (2011), Richard von Mises regarded the frequency approach 
to probability theory as a science of the same order as geometry or theoretical 
mechanics, because he believed that probability should be based on facts and not 
a lack of them. The frequency theory links probability with the real world through 
the observed objective facts (or data), with special regard to the recurring facts.
In the logical approach discussed in more detail above, the probability theory 
emerges as a part of logic, as the extension of deductive logic to inductive cases. 
In contrast to this view, a proponent of the frequency approach sees probability 
theory as a mathematical science, like mechanics, but with a different band of 
observable phenomena. Hauwe emphasises that this means probability cannot be 
interpreted in this way in an epistemic sense. It is not the absence of knowledge 
(uncertainty) that lays the theoretical foundation for probability, but the observa-
tion of a high number of events.
According to Hársing (1965), Richard von Mises sees relative frequency (statistical 
probability) as the exclusive form of probability. He defines probability as the lim-
iting value of relative frequency obtained through the infinite repetition of a trial. 
Iván Bélyácz – KatalIn DauBner34
He excludes the problematics of moral decisions from the field of probability. In 
his opinion, the concept of probability is only applicable in the following three 
areas:games of chance, insurance transactions and mechanical and physical phe-
nomena. The most importance circumstance is that Richard von Mises rejects the 
concept of logical probability on the basis that it is subjective in nature (Richard 
von Mises, 1928:10–11).
In his critique, Hauwe (2011) also mentions that probability in economics is not 
a manifestation of physical entities as Richard von Mises supposes when con-
structing his theory. The empirical underpinnings of probability are missing in 
the economic sense, for example with respect to objective frequency probability. 
Richard von Mises is naturally aware of the fact that the frequency concept is not 
applicable in the moral sciences, because in the absence of events the conditions 
would be fulfillable as a collective. He wrote the following on this:
“Extending the validity of the exact sciences was a characteristic feature of 
excessive rationalism in the 18th century. We do not intend to make the same 
mistake” (Richard von Mises, 1928:76).
The main flaw in this theory is that it is too narrow, as probability is used in many 
important situations; but among these there are none in which the empirical col-
lective can be defined in an economics context. The definition is too narrow for 
application in economics.
Hauwe (2011) identifies mismatches between the theories of Richard von Mises 
and Keynes. For Richard von Mises, probability is a part of empirical science; 
for Keynes, on the other hand, it is an extension of deductive logic. Richard von 
Mises defines probability as frequency with limiting values, and Keynes as a de-
gree of rational belief. For Richard von Mises the probability axioms are derivable 
from two empirical laws by abstraction, while for Keynes they can be obtained 
through direct logical intuition. Richard von Mises believes we can only evaluate 
probabilities that are within empirical collectives, and only these probabilities 
have scientific value. For Keynes, all probability obeys the same formal rules and 
plays the same role in our thinking. Certain special aspects of the situation permit 
us to assign numerical values in some case, but not generally. By virtue of his 
recognition that probability frequency does not cover everything that we think 
about probability, Keynes’s position is close to the view of Ludwig von Mises.
While the frequency theory of probability relates to the cardinally measurable 
degree of probability, case probability – according to Ludwig von Mises (1969) 
– does not lend itself to any form of numerical assessment. In keeping with this 
view, case probability focuses on the individual events, which are not as a rule 
parts of a series, and case probability is only measurable in the ordinal sense; case 
probability has no cardinal value.
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Both Ludwig von Mises and Keynes accepted the epistemic interpretation of 
probability, but Richard von Mises unambiguously recognises the objective theo-
ry of probability. Ludwig von Mises’s and Keynes’s views amount to an argument 
that the economic interpretation of probability suggest that it is more epistemic 
than objective by nature.  At the same time, both Ludwig von Mises and Keynes, 
in their own ways, recognise the existence of unmeasurable (or non-numerical) 
probabilities, as well as the epistemic and scientific legitimacy of these, while the 
customary measurable probabilities have a defined numerical value in the [0, 1] 
interval. Although Richard von Mises conceded that there was a generally ac-
cepted concept of probability that was not covered by his theory of frequency, he 
nevertheless insisted that there is only one conception of probability that has sci-
entific relevance. To express his views in other words:There is only one scientific 
approach to the subject, and there is no room for the purely qualitative concep-
tion of probability. Although the applicability of the frequency theory of prob-
ability is called into question in several areas of natural science, there appears to 
be agreement in favour of two conclusions:according to one, in any case the scope 
of frequency theory is not broad enough for economics; according to the other, the 
fact that in economics probability is a qualitative, and not a numerical concept, if 
both necessary and scientifically legitimate.
Hársing’s (1965) evaluation of Richard von Mises’s theory confirms our supposi-
tion that this theory – in essence – is a redefinition of the 19th-centiry frequentist 
conception of probability. According to Richard von Mises, probability calculus 
is the theory of recurring cases of certain pseudo-random or random events or 
series of events, like the rolling of dice. These series are defined by two axiomatic 
conditions as a “pseudorandom” or random series:One of these is the convergence 
axiom (or boundary axiom), and the other is the axiom of randomness. If a series 
of events fulfils both conditions, then to use Richard von Mises’s terminology 
it makes up a “collective”. A collective – put simply – is a series of instances or 
events that could theoretically continue indefinitely.
The convergence axiom assumes that with the lengthening of the series of events 
the frequency series approaches a defined threshold value. Richard von Mises 
uses this axiom because for the purpose of application we need to make a fre-
quency value certain. For Richard von Mises, probability is another word for “rel-
ative frequency value in a collective.” In his approach the concept of probability 
is applicable to a series of events; this restriction is diametrically opposed to the 
Keynesian position, and therefore it is entirely unacceptable if that is taken as the 
starting point.
The two axioms used by Richard von Mises to define the “collective” have come 
in for strong criticism, which Hársing believes is not entirely unjustified. The 
linking of the convergence axiom and the randomness axiom, in particular, were 
Iván Bélyácz – KatalIn DauBner36
criticised on the basis that it is not permissible to apply the concept of the math-
ematical threshold value or convergence to a series which – by definition (viz. due 
to the randomness axiom) – cannot be subordinated to any kind of rule.19.
Reichenbach (1961) only recognises statistical probability, which – in his concep-
tion – is the limiting value of the relative frequency of random events. Accord-
ingly, he believes that one-off events have no probability. Despite the fact that 
he ultimately only recognises statistical probability, Reichenbach also discusses 
logical probability. He believes, however, that logical probability is secondary in 
nature and can be traced back to statistical probability. It only differs from the 
latter in the fact that it is not based on the relative truth frequency of the events 
themselves, but of the statements made about them.20
Reichenbach regards the statistical approach of Richard von Mises to be the only 
possible interpretation. Thus, ultimately, Reichenbach’s logical probability is 
nothing other than the logical interpretation of Richard von Mises’s approach. 
As we have just noted, the probability that a statement is true – in Reichenbach’s 
conception – represents the frequency with which that statement is true (Reichen-
bach, 1961:319-326). If, like Reichenbach, we perceive logical probability as a gen-
eralisation of classical logic, then the greatest difficulty is caused by the linking 
of the concepts of truth and logical probability. It is known that truth (in an epis-
temic sense) is the relationship between the facts and a statement. Logical prob-
ability, on the other hand – in Reichenbach’s conception – describes the relations 
of statement-sequences.
Reichenbach initially viewed probability as a limiting value in the mathematical 
sense, similarly to Richard von Mises. Later, when it was demonstrated that this 
approach leads to difficulties, he modified his conception so that the threshold 
value featured in the concept was not strictly mathematical in nature, but a so-
called practical limiting value, the existence of which is based on the laws govern-
ing reality and the determinateness of the phenomena.
19 An an series can have a limit value if number A is such that an infinite number of items in the 
series fall its arbitrary domain, and only a fine numbers fall outside of it. In this case number A 
will be the limit value.
20 According to Hársing (1971a), this approach does not differ significantly from the widely held 
view that probability is the centre of fluctuation of relative frequency and goes beyond Reichen-
back’s often unilaterally empiric attitude.
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7.2  The evolution of logical probability  
and its variants outside economic thought
Following publication of the TP, Keynes did not concern himself at all with the 
theoretical problems of probability; nevertheless, the issue of probability did re-
appear – albeit indirectly – in the GT, in connection with the formation of expec-
tations. It should also be noted that Keynes did not participate in the scholarly 
efforts that came after the breakthrough in logical probability that he initiated.
According to Carnap (1950) there is not one, but two concepts of probability; one 
is empirical, the other logical in nature, and both are objective. He considered the 
logical interpretation of probability to be one of several possible definitions rather 
than the only permissible one. In Carnap’s view, one of the probability concepts 
is “probability 1”, which describes the relationship between statements (specifi-
cally the degree by which a statement logically strengthens other statements); the 
other concept is “probability 2”, which relates to the relationship between classes 
of events. Probability 1, therefore, is one example of how probability is viewed as 
a relational property of statements.
Amsterdamski (1965) highlights that, for Carnap, probability is the degree of con-
firmation of statements, while for Jeffrey (1939; 1954) it is the degree of rational 
belief. According to Amsterdamski, Carnap considers “degrees of rational belief” 
to be a bad term, because in Carnap’s view the substance of Keynes’s and Jeffreys’s 
theory is that probability is nothing other than the degree by which a statement 
reinforces other statements; in other words, we are talking about logical prob-
ability. Neither Jeffreys nor Keynes recognise the existence of the two probability 
concepts, so as far as they are concerned the probability statements were never 
about what kind of events are probable; they only ever talk about which state-
ments receive the most robust confirmation from the information available to 
the subject. Carnap identifies the concept of rational belief – from Keynes’s and 
Jeffreys’s theory – with the principle of his “degree of confirmation” and identifies 
the whole conception with logical interpretation.
Logical probability – in Carnap’s approach – is created from rational belief by ab-
stracting from the holder of the rational belief, as an epistemic subject, and only 
taking into consideration the logical relationship between certain past results of 
observation (the evidence) and the new knowledge (hypothesis). Thus, logical 
probability is simply the degree of confirmation (Hársing, 1971). Carnap refers to 
the version of probability devised by him as inductive logic.21
21 The classic version of intuitive deduction is generalisation. To use the terminology of mathemati-
cal statistics, generalisation is simply the drawing of conclusions, from a statistical sample, re-
garding the population (group) as a whole.
Iván Bélyácz – KatalIn DauBner38
Carnap defines the degree of confirmation in a semantic system. In this, a numer-
ical value is assignable to every statement. If we know, for example, the numerical 
value assigned to statements k and a, the P(a/k) value can be defined; that is, the 
extent to which k confirms a (Carnap–Stegmüller, 1954:138-198).
Pólya (1949) applies the premises of abstract probability calculus in a compara-
tive sense, for investigation of so-called plausible conclusions. Pólya – like Car-
nap – recognises the legitimacy of the two interpretations of probability, but just 
like Keynes he regards logical probability as the degree of rational belief. He, 
however, categorically rejects the quantitative interpretability of logical prob-
ability. On this basis, Pólya recognises two qualitatively different variants of 
probability:statistical probability and plausibility (plausibility being the degree of 
confirmation of hypotheses). “Viewed from the first perspective” he writes, “the 
theory of probability is the theory of observable phenomena of a certain type, the 
theory of random mass phenomena, and probability itself corresponds to relative 
frequency theory within a long series. From the second perspective, probability 
theory is the logic of plausible conclusions and probability is the degree of rational 
belief”. Hársing (1965) points out that the first position is close in essence to the 
views of Richard von Mises and the second is closer to those of Keynes (Pólya, 
1949:28; Hársing, 1965:953).
The “propensity” concept of objective probability states that probability is a pro-
pensity or tendency of nature that typifies a certain event once without neces-
sarily being related to longer-term frequency. It is important to note that these 
propensities are presumed to be objectively extant, if only in the metaphysical 
world. In this approach, probability really is the extent of absence of knowledge 
of the conditions that could influence the toss of a coin, and thus it merely reflects 
the sentiment relating to the trial.
Gillies (1988) takes propensity theory to be any approach that assumes objective 
probability but is not a relative frequency-based interpretation. Popper’s (1934) 
aim in creating propensity theory was to also be capable of assigning an objective 
probability to singular events22. Gillies criticises this view that objective probabil-
ity can also be attributed to singular events; if we can find a narrowest reference 
class through which the probability of the singular event can be determined as 
the relative frequency of similar types of event in the given class. The probabil-
ity of occurrence of a singular event depends on how we describe then event, 
and thus also on what background information we have regarding a particular 
22 Hársing (1971a) believes that the physical motivation for this effort was quantum mechanics. 
Popper (1997) – in his early theory – takes a set of initial generating conditions and regards them 
as having a certain tendency – a propensity – to “generate” the observed frequency.
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event. According to Keynes (1921), any additional knowledge we may possess has 
an even greater role than our statistical knowledge:in certain cases, the latter may 
be completely modified by the former in relation to a singular event.
8  THE IMPACT OF PROBABILITY THEORY  
ON KEYNES’S ECONOMICS THINKING
In itself, the fact that in the analysis of long-term expectations set out in the GT 
we were able to refer, on several strands of enquiry, to the Keynes’s probabili-
ty concepts and arguments found in his TP, shows that these probability labels 
could have been the roots of his ideas relating to expectations. The premise that 
Keynes’s thoughts on probability served as the basis for his theory of economic 
expectations is an accepted proposition among post-Keynesian thinkers23. Ac-
cording to O’Donnell (1990/b), Keynes’s (1921) TP is the appropriate starting 
point for understanding how the GT addresses uncertainty, expectations and 
behaviour. O’Donnell believes that we cannot find a precise parallel; what we do 
find, however, is an intermediated parallelism:one factor is the transition from 
the philosophical to the economic plane, while the other is the shift towards non-
determinedness within the constraints of Keynesian philosophy.
In stark contrast to the dominant role of expectations, probabilities have a subor-
dinate role in the GT. Known probabilities – whether numerical or non-numer-
ical – are not fundamental concepts in the GT; the probability categories are not 
of central importance in this work on economics. In Keynes’s GT, expectations 
are a general behavioural concept, and not probabilities. O’Donnell highlights 
that the actors always have expectations, but they do not always have probabili-
ties. The expectations may have the nature of probabilities, they may be objective 
or subjective, strongly rational or weakly rational, or even irrational. Keynes’s 
GT is primarily supported with induction, and this inductive approach has two 
parts:The first is the extrapolation of knowledge into the future; the second is the 
modification of this extrapolation in the light of specific, anticipated changes. 
O’Donnell believes that the second element is the truly important one, because 
Keynes recognised that the extrapolation demanded by rational behaviour has to 
be altered if there are grounds to believe that the future will differ from the past.
O’Donnell (1990b) also emphasised that Keynes (1921), in his work on probability, 
regarded it as a fundamental principle that philosophy and methodology perform 
23 Examples include the works of O’Donnell (1989: 247-272) and Carabelli (1988). Shackle’s 
(1972) Epistemics and Economics also deals with this topic.
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a controlling function in economic argument. Keynes viewed reality as a primar-
ily qualitative entity in the sense that the objective qualities of life do not have 
“numerical” quantifiability or a formalised character. The preliminary qualitative 
logical analysis must precede the quantitative investigation. Because both the rel-
ative and the absolute nature of probability suggests that they do not necessarily 
exist as a part of material reality, there is a need for a priori consideration. Lawson 
(1988) comments on Keynes’s thinking as follows:
“…throughout his total contributions [Keynes] is explicit that such a priori 
thought is considered always to be open to constant modification and correc-
tion through continual interaction with experiences of the real world” (Law-
son, 1988:56).
Of particular importance here is Keynes’s comment to the effect that probabilities 
must be made contingent on current uncertainties and knowledge, without regard-
ing probabilities as relative frequency, since this will change after it has emerged. 
Moreover, Keynes’s focus on the fundamentally qualitative nature of reality sug-
gests that both informal argument and intuitive judgement are necessary for eco-
nomic reasoning.
The concept of rational belief has a key role in Keynes’s works on probability and 
economics. He saw two paths to the attainment of rational belief regarded future 
prospects if perfect knowledge was not available. The first is based on the forma-
tion of probability, which can be arrived at either through uncertain information 
or a “doubtful argument” (Keynes, 1921:3). In the second case, it is impossible to 
define rational belief. In this event, actions are determined by the animal spir-
its. These are precisely the two types of uncertainty that classical theory rules 
out with the assumption that individuals have full or certain knowledge of what 
Keynes calls the “primary proposition” that a person sets out to validate.
Skidelsky (2011) offers a convincing argument as to why uncertainty was the main 
motif in Keynes’s work. Skidelsky believes that principal reason was that the fu-
ture cannot be forecast because it is open. On this, he writes the following:“It is 
‘open’, in large part, because it depends on our intentions and beliefs, and on the 
organic nature of human life. In talking about irreducible uncertainty Keynes 
does not just have in mind ignorance of the relevant probabilities, but genuine 
ontological indeterminacy:some probabilities are not just unknown, but non-ex-
istent” (Skidelsky, op. cit. 3). Keynes essentially believed that this is only relevant 
in areas that are characterised by risk rather than uncertainty, and therefore the 
investment markets are ruled out.
Brady (1983) recognises the most consistently that Keynes did not oppose at-
tempts at approaching probabilities with estimates between lower and higher 
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thresholds or limits (op. cit. 27). This argument is related to the following extract 
from Keynes:
“It is evident that the cases in which exact numerical measurement is pos-
sible are a very limited class (…) The sphere of inexact numerical compari-
son is not, however, quite so limited. Many probabilities, which are incapable 
of numerical measurement, can be placed nevertheless between numerical 
limits. And by taking particular non-numerical probabilities as standards a 
great number of comparisons or approximate measurements become possible. 
If we can place a probability in an order of magnitude with some standard 
probability, we can obtain its approximate measure by comparison” (Keynes, 
1921:160; cited in Brady, 1983).
While Keynes recognises that actual, precise numerical measurement is lim-
ited to identical probabilities through application of the principle of indiffer-
ence (Keynes, 1921:Chapter 4); however, in the next chapter (5) he concludes 
that “Many probabilities, which are incapable of numerical measurement can be 
placed between (higher or lower) numerical limits, comparing them with various 
non-numerical (or numerical) probabilities selected as the standard”.
Keynes believed that logical probability, as a qualitative category, is the most suit-
able for describing the chances of occurrent both of series of events and of singular 
events, and that neither classical probability nor the frequency variant of prob-
ability is appropriate for this. Here is Keynes’s (1921) argument supporting this 
position:
“In fact underwriters themselves distinguish between risks which are properly 
insurable, either because their probability can be estimated between com-
paratively narrow numerical limits or because it is possible to make a “book” 
which covers all possibilities, and other risks which cannot be dealt with in 
this way and which cannot form the basis of a regular business of insurance – 
although an occasional gamble may be indulged in. I believe, therefore, that 
the practice of underwriters weakens rather than supports the contention that 
all probabilities can be measured and estimated numerically” (op. cit. 24).
In many respects, Keynes referred to himself an unconditional adherent to esti-
mating the probability interval, and thus he rejected validation of the additivity 
criterion under all circumstances. Keynes’s argument was that probabilities are 
primarily intervals and not singular numerical values or ordinal rankings. This is 
confirmed by the following passage from Keynes:
“If we pass from the opinions of theorists to the experience of practical men, 
it might perhaps be held that a presumption in favour of the numerical valu-
ation of all probabilities can be based on the practice of underwriters and the 
willingness of Lloyd’s to insure against practically any risk. Underwriters are 
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actually willing, it might be urged, to name a numerical measure in every 
case, and to back their opinion with money. But this practice shows no more 
than that many probabilities are greater or less than some numerical meas-
ure, not that they themselves are numerically definite. It is sufficient for the 
underwriter if the premium he names exceeds the probable risk. But, apart 
from this, I doubt whether in extreme cases the process of thought, through 
which he goes before naming a premium, is wholly rational and determinate; 
or that two equally intelligent brokers acting on the same evidence would al-
ways arrive at the same result” (Keynes, 1921:22–23).
When Keynes refers to knowledge and being informed, he means these true 
statements, regardless of whether they are direct or indirect knowledge. It is also 
clear that the rational belief encompassed by his theory is ultimately based on 
knowledge and thus on the truth. As Ramsey (1931:190) puts it, Keynes’s method 
was based on the fact that it only certified probable belief in relation to certain 
knowledge.
Right up until the middle of the 20th century, the economics thinkers concerned 
with uncertainty, risk and probability deliberately embraced complexity, and 
used probability to represent it. The peak of this thought process was Keynes’s 
TP of 1921, GT of 1936 and GTE of 1937; in these, probability and uncertainty ap-
pear as qualitative properties of decision-making, a mode of thinking suitable for 
covering economics as completely as possible. Following this – especially with 
the redefinition of the frequency theory of probability – the principles of measur-
ability and quantifiability became dominant, and complexity was expressed with 
probability distributions, expected values and standard deviation as compressed 
values. Through this, the range of analytical possibilities was expanded but the 
complexity disappeared from the approaches. This process can also be described 
as the avoidance of complexity. An important question is what led to the simulta-
neous acceptance and avoidance of uncertainty in the mainstream of economics.
The rise of formalisation in economics coincided with the decline of the uncer-
tainty conception, and the main reason for this is clear:It is difficult to incorpo-
rate uncertainty, as a non-quantitative phenomenon, into the formalised mod-
els. Therefore, numerous representatives of the mainstream simply purged this 
concept from their theories. Lucas (1977:15) wrote that “in cases of uncertainty, 
economic reasoning will be of no value”. This puts us in mind of Arrow’s (1951:417) 
analysis of Knight’s concept of uncertainty, which reaches the conclusion that 
“measurable probability cannot be established for such cases”. In this context, 
Lucas and Arrow confirm that the economic reasoning and the theory must be 
quantitative. In this regard, they have disregarded Knight’s and Keynes’s objec-
tion that uncertainty is not quantifiable. The waning of Knight’s and Keynes’s 
concept of uncertainty is attributable to a multitude of factors in the economic 
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mainstream, including the fact that models are expected to yield forecasts24. In 
economics – with the emphasis on testing and forecasting – he was only able to 
make uncertainty manageable, in order to reduce risk, by giving it a calculable 
form.
With the emergence and rise of mathematical formalisation within economics, 
thinkers exploring expectations and uncertainty chose abstraction over complex-
ity. Rowley–Hamouda (1987) believe that this shift was strengthened by the hope 
that the formulation, in itself, could be successful in making analytical solutions 
assignable to mathematically formed phenomena.
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